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ABSTRACT 
 
During the late 1980s, government agencies in many countries began to implement public 
sector management reforms to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. Many of these 
reforms were prompted by demands placed on governments for improved uses of public 
funds. In 2005, the Malaysian government and the Manpower Planning and Modernising 
Unit (MAMPU) circular 2/2005 introduced the concept of Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) for the public sector. Few studies have analysed these reforms in Malaysia. Based 
on a survey of Federal and State governments in Malaysia, this paper examines 
performance indicators and accountability practices and explains the hypothesised 
relationships between oversight bodies, political visibility and the accounting abilities of 
bureaucrats. Institutional theory was used to develop the theories and interpretive 
techniques used in this research. Multiple regression analysis was used to analyse the 
hypothesised relationships.  This research provides an understanding of factors that 
influence the use of performance measures, which, in turn, could be used to formulate 
future government policy. 
 
Keywords:  Malaysia public sector reporting, performance indicators, performance 
indicator disclosure 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Performance measurements have been widely promoted by the Malaysian 
government for more than twenty years for the express purpose of increasing 
management focus on achieving results (Winston, 1999). The areas of 
performance included accountability and transparency education. The Malaysian 
government recognised the need for public sector entities to improve their 
efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of services and to provide better 
accountability and transparency, and they implemented the New Public 
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Management (NPM) model (Winston, 1999; Hood, 1991, 1995). This model is 
based on the fundamental concept that public sector organisations can and should 
borrow management strategies from the private sector. A worldwide trend toward 
this type of governmental management resulted in public sector changes in the 
1980s and 1990s. Organisations transitioned away from decentralisation and 
privatisation to the development of goal-driven and client-orientated strategies 
(Nichol & Taylor, 2001). During this transition, management techniques from the 
private sector were introduced to many public sector organisations. Many 
governmental entities in developed countries, such as Australia, U.K., U.S and 
Canada, have introduced elements of NPM (Ter  Bogt, 2004). As a logical 
consequence of globalisation in the beginning of the reform era in 1999, the 
Malaysian government introduced NPM programs, such as performance 
measurement reporting, to respond to public demands for productivity, 
transparency and accountability. This response to public demand followed trends 
initiated in developed countries across the world, where performance 
measurement has become the core of management reform to enhance 
accountability (de Lancer Julnes, 2006). 
 
In Malaysia, at the end of the Mahathir regime, citizens have been 
pushing for improvements in the performance of the public sector and the 
Manpower, Planning and the Modernising Unit (MAMPU) of the current Prime 
Minister (Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak). Decentralisation as a strategy 
for economic and social development and for nation building is now accepted 
around the world. Most developing and transition nations have adopted some 
type of decentralised program (Nichol & Taylor, 2001). Decentralisation could be 
the appropriate policy for Malaysia because it moves government decisions 
closer to the people, an essential aspect of governance in a large and diverse 
country (Nichol & Taylor, 2001). Decentralisation could also lead to better public 
services, better public servants and more participation. Thus, decentralisation 
could strengthen, stabilise and further democratise Malaysia (Nichol & Taylor, 
2001). 
 
The concepts of NPM and public sector corporate governance are closely 
related. Accountability is an important component of corporate governance and 
performance measurement. Performance measurement, in turn, is an important 
element of NPM and is viewed as a means to discharge accountability. Therefore, 
this study focused on accountability and performance measurement. Over the last 
two decades, the idea of performance measurement has received a considerable 
amount of attention from both academics and practitioners (Neely, 1999). 
Originally, this type of research mainly considered performance measurement in 
the private sector (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan, 1983). However, the 
number of studies addressing performance measurement in the public sector has 
been steadily increasing (Brignall & Modell, 2000; Lapsley, 1996; Hood, James, Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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Jones, Scott, & Travers,  1998). Public sector organisations, particularly 
governments in Western countries such as Australia, U.K., U.S. and Canada, use 
performance measurement to improve management strategies and to provide the 
most value to taxpayers. In Malaysia, interest in performance measurement began 
when former Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi  introduced the 
concept of key performance indicators (KPIs) for the public sector in MAMPU 
circular 2/2005. The programme established KPI to measure the performance of 
officials and agencies and National Key Result Areas to define goals for specific 
areas of public policy. The prime minister also introduced a new cabinet position 
to support the Unity and Performance Minister in implementing the KPI system 
(Prime Minister Office of Malaysia, 2010). 
 
Based on a pilot study of interviews and a field survey of Federal and 
State Government Departments in Malaysia and using hypothesised relationships 
between independent and dependent variables, this research explores the use and 
disclosure of performance indicators. The independent variables include 
oversight bodies, political visibility, and the accounting abilities of bureaucrats. 
The Dependent variable includes the extent of the use of performance indicators. 
This study also examined the extent of disclosure of accountability information 
and the Senior Finance Officer's (SFO) perceptions of the disclosure of 
accountability information and the use of performance indicators. 
 
Institutional theory was used to develop the theories and interpretive 
techniques used in this research. This research provides an understanding of 
factors that influence the development and use of performance measures, which, 
in turn, could be used to formulate future government policy. This paper begins 
within the framework on which this research is based. Then it  describes the 
development of the hypotheses. The next section discusses the research method, 
presents the results, and conclusions. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
The institutional theory literature emphasises the tendency of organisational 
structure and processes to become isomorphic within the accepted norms of 
organisations of particular types  (di Maggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional 
isomorphism is defined as a process of institutionalisation, whereby in a given 
social setting, a specific organisation is induced by specific factors relative to 
social institutions to assume initially extraneous features, to incorporate them, 
and then to take them for granted (Lippi, 2000). Studies of institutional 
isomorphism have described the adjustment of associative organisations and 
small firms to administrative bureaucracies and large companies, respectively. 
Recently, this concept has been widely employed in the social sciences to Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
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formulate hypotheses for analysing similarities between the public sectors of 
different countries (Lippi, 2000). 
 
Institutionalisation occurs in part because people conform to or take for 
granted certain behaviours and processes (di Maggio & Powell, 1983). 
Standardised behaviours enable people to focus on new problems and to rely on 
experience for issues that are not pressing (Eisenhardt, 1988). Eisenhardt (1988) 
also contends that organisational structures and processes become part of an 
integrated whole without unravelling the whole. Rather, the use of structures and 
processes that are legitimated by the environment can be sensible because this 
approach implies a reasonable management approach, pleases others external to 
the organisation, and avoids potential claims of negligence if something goes 
wrong (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 
Scott (1987, p. 496) defines Institutionalisation as "the social process by 
which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality—a 
conception whose validity is seen as independent of the actor's own views or 
actions but is taken for granted as defining the way things are and/or the way 
things are to be done." Institutionalisation occurs in part because people conform 
to or take for granted the ways of doing things. Such standard ways of doing 
things allows people to focus on new problems and to rely on experience for 
issues that are not pressing (Scott, 1987). 
 
Accounting changes have been studied from an institutional perspective. 
Berry,  Coad,  Harris, Otley and Stringer  (2009) argues that performance 
measurements in public sector organisations have changed from functionalist, 
behavioural, interpretive and critical perspectives to being influenced by 
institutional theories (Berry et al., 2009). Their study assumes that organisations 
compete not only for resources and customers but also for political power and 
institutional legitimacy. Berry et al. (2009) state that performance measurements 
are diffused throughout organisations by coercive and normative processes. 
 
The institutional literature emphasises that organisational structure and 
processes tend to become isomorphic within the accepted norms for organisations 
of particular types (di Maggio & Powell, 1983). Di Maggio and Powell describe 
two types of isomorphism: (a) competitive isomorphism and (b) institutional 
isomorphism. The former is most relevant for open competition while the latter is 
defined as a process of institutionalisation whereby in a given social setting, an 
organisation is induced by factors relative to social institutions to assume initially 
extraneous features, to incorporate them, and then to take them for granted. 
Isomorphism is a useful concept in the modern organisational era in which 
politics and ceremony are embedded in organisational life. di Maggio and Powell 
(1983)  identified  three isomorphic forces. First, coercive  isomorphism arises Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
39 
from political influence and the problem of legitimacy. This pressure comes from 
both formal and informal pressures from other organisations, and normative 
isomorphism is usually associated with professionalism. 
 
Performance Measurement and Isomorphism 
 
Over the years, management control systems based largely on performance 
measurements have been studied from functionalist, behavioural, interpretative 
and critical perspectives (Pilcher, 2007). 
 
Studies of institutional isomorphism have described the adjustment of 
associative organisations and small firms to administrative bureaucracies and 
large companies, respectively. More recently, the concept has been widely 
employed in the social sciences to formulate hypotheses for analysing similarities 
between the public sectors of different countries (Lippi, 2000). Recent studies 
have been influenced by institutional theories (Berry et al., 2009). In studies that 
adopt these theories, organisations are assumed to compete not only for resources 
and customers but also for political power and institutional legitimacy. Therefore, 
from this perspective, the logistics of change in performance measurement 
systems (PMS) are institutionalised into organisations by coercive, mimetic and 
normative processes (di Maggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Because the study of performance measurement in government emerged 
as a result of public sector reform, it is appropriate to refer to the concept of 
institutional isomorphism (Pilcher, 2007). With regard to public sector reforms, 
Brignall and Modell (2000) argued that normative frameworks and studies of 
their applications are based on rational instrumentalism. Consequently, Brignall 
and Modell (2000) argue that power relationships and the conflicting interests 
between stakeholders in modern public sector organisations have been neglected. 
From an institutional theory point of view, they argued that the interests of key 
public sector stakeholders, including the state, professionals, and service 
purchasers, are often inconsistent. 
 
Brignall and Modell (2000) observed that: 
 
The use of a particular aspect of performance measures within a 
public sector organisation might depend on the power 
relationship between its constituents and itself. For example, it is 
very likely that when facing a more powerful central 
government, a local unit would have to conform to performance 
measures (e.g., financial targets) required to satisfy central 
government's interests (p. 295). Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
40 
Brignall and Modell (2000) noted that performance measures may thus 
be used by managers to seek legitimacy from a coercive stakeholder, rather than 
to deliver managers to seek legitimacy from a coercive stakeholder, rather than to 
deliver organisational long term objectives. Institutional theory suggests that 
"organisations pursue 'legitimacy' by conforming to isomorphic pressure in their 
environment" (Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009, p. 1). 
 
This study investigates the perceptions of Senior Finance Officers (SFOs) 
from Malaysian Federal and State Government Departments related to 
performance measurement within an institutional theory framework. SFOs were 
asked a series of questions on the use of performance measures in their 
department. The use of performance measurement within a government may 
depend on the power relationship between its constituents and itself. In a 
decentralised government such as Malaysia, the central authority normally has 
more coercive power over State and Local governments than other constituents 
(Brignall & Modell, 2000). Local Governments were considered to be outside the 
scope of this study. 
 
Coercive Isomorphism 
 
Coercive isomorphic pressures reflect the enforcement aspects of certain 
institutions (Granlund & Lukka, 1998). Human behaviour is controlled by rules 
and monitoring activities, with such controls being exerted by force, persuasion 
or invitations to join in collusion (Neilson, 2002). Coercive isomorphism is the 
result of pressures, both formal and informal, exerted on organisations by other 
organisations (di Maggio & Powell, 1983). Within Malaysia, federal and state 
governments use numerous forms of coercive isomorphic pressures, including 
both internal and external influences. 
 
Institutional theory suggests that organisations should pursue 
"legitimacy"  by conforming to isomorphic pressures in their environment 
(Ashworth et al., 2009). This study investigated the perceptions of SFOs from 
Malaysian Federal and State governments related to performance measurement 
within an institutional theory framework. A face-to-face survey instrument was 
used, and SFOs were asked a series of questions related to their perceptions of 
performance measurement practices in their department. The use of performance 
measurement within a government may depend on the power relationship 
between its constituents and itself. For example, when facing a more powerful 
government, a State government must conform to a performance measurement 
regime mandated by the Federal government. In a decentralised government such 
as Malaysia, the Federal government normally has more coercive power over 
State governments than other constituents (Brignall & Modell, 2000). The use of Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
41 
performance measurements within a government may depend on the power 
relationship between its constituents and itself. 
 
In Malaysia, the central government, via the enactment of laws and 
regulations that affect state governments, is a potential source of isomorphic 
pressures. These regulations include MAMPU circular 2/2005, which requires all 
government agencies to report key performance indicators to appraise the 
performance of all government departments. This coercive pressure occurs 
because most state government departments are heavily dependent on the central 
government for their financial resources. Even though state government 
departments are required to submit performance reports to the central 
government, they are not required to use performance information in their day-to-
day management practices. Therefore, an understanding of the factors that 
influence the development and use of performance measures is important. 
Knowledge of these factors could be used to evaluate and improve future 
government policy. 
 
This coercive pressure occurs because most state governments are 
heavily dependent on the Federal government for their financial resources. Even 
though state governments are required to submit performance reports to the 
federal government, they are not required to use performance information in their 
day-to-day management practices. 
 
In Malaysia, the Government Transformation Programme (GTP) was 
developed in January 2001 in accordance with the principles of Malaysia, People 
First, Performance Now. In its entirety, the GTP is designed to provide all 
Malaysians with access to improved public services irrespective of race, religion 
and region. 
  
The GTP has two objectives: 
 
1.   To improve the efficiency with which the government delivers services and 
the accountability of outcomes relevant to the Rakyat. 
2.   To encourage the development of Malaysia into an advanced, united, and just 
society with high standards of living for all. 
 
These objectives are consistent with the national mission of achieving Vision 
2020 and ensuring that Malaysia becomes a fully developed nation. Under the 
GTP, six key priority areas have been identified, and challenges within each area 
have been divided into short-term priorities and long-term issues. These areas of 
development, known as the National Key Results Areas (NKRAs), include the 
following: Reducing Crime, Fighting Corruption, Improving Student Outcomes, 
Raising Living Standards of Low-Income Households, Improving Rural Basic Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
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Infrastructure and Improving Urban Public Transport. For these objectives, the 
Federal government exerts coercive pressure on state and other government 
agencies. 
 
Although state government departments are required to submit 
performance reports to the federal government, they are not required to use 
performance information in their day-to-day management practices. Therefore, an 
understanding of the factors that influence the development and use of 
performance measures is important. Knowledge of these factors could be used to 
evaluate and improve future government policy. Coercive isomorphism is 
proxied by oversight bodies. Oversight bodies, such as the Accountants of the 
General Office and the Treasury Department, are regulatory agencies that help 
other State departments to conform to Federal rules and regulations. Therefore, 
oversight bodies can be proxied for coercive isomorphism to influence the types 
of PIs used by Malaysian Federal and State government departments. Oversight 
bodies are relevant to the success of reforms in government organisations 
(Brignall & Modell, 2000). 
 
Coercive isomorphism is also proxied by a size measure. Size may 
influence the GRI Indicators used by Australian state government departments. 
The size of an organisation relates to the ability and capacity of the organisation 
to collect information, retain knowledge and use this knowledge in performance 
measurements. Larger organisations are better able to provide data, information 
and facts about performance measurement (Garengo, Biazzo, & Bititci, 2005). 
Small organisations are often hindered by limited resources, both financial and 
human, and weaker long-term planning (Rosair & Taylor, 2000; Gibson & 
Guthrie, 1995). 
 
Lynch (2010, p. 36) noted that "Public Sector organisations would be 
expected to face greater pressure to disclose information than private sector 
organisations. This is due to their larger, more diverse group of stakeholders". 
Thus, the size of a government department can be a coercive pressure according 
to institutional theory. The size factor mirrors the political cost hypothesis of 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), which states that entities subjected to a greater 
amount of scrutiny are more likely to disclose information than those subjected to 
less scrutiny. This result is supported by the results of Mucciarone (2010), which 
show a significant positive relationship between the size of Australian State 
government departments and the extent of performance indicator dissemination 
by those departments. 
 
A large state government department may draw greater scrutiny from 
various constituent parties if it fails to voluntarily disclose accountability 
information (Mucciarone, 2010). Thus, the size of a state department is an Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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indicator of the relative impact of coercive isomorphism on the propensity of 
Australian state departments to disclose key performance indicators. Size is 
measured as the number of employees in a state department and the total revenue 
to minimise skewness, as with nearly all topics in this area. Thus, the presence of 
oversight bodies (Accountant–General office) and the size of government 
departments (the number of employees and the total revenue) are proxies for 
coercive isomorphism. 
 
Normative Isomorphism 
 
The second element of isomorphism is normative. Ryan and Purcell (2004, p. 10) 
define normative isomorphism as "shared norms of organisational members, that 
is, those values that may be unspoken, or expectations that have gained 
acceptance within organisations". 
 
Because of the limited capacity of human resources in Federal and State 
government departments, in the last decade, more attention has been given to the 
education of government employees and officials. Malaysia has made enormous 
strides in its education system over the past 50 years. An adult literacy rate of 
92% has been achieved; primary school enrolment has been made universal; and 
the growth rate of secondary school enrolment is among the highest in 
developing countries. di Maggio and Powell (1983) argued that as the education 
level of the workforce improves, in terms of academic qualifications and 
participation in professional and trade associations, the extent to which an 
organisation resembles similar organisations will increase. 
 
An organisational factor that is expected to influence the use of 
performance indicators is bureaucratic experience (Cheng, 1992). In her model, 
Cheng (1992) included eleven theoretical variables that were deemed to directly 
or indirectly affect the decisions of bureaucrats in U.S. State governments on 
issues related to the provision of accounting information. The results show that 
the accounting abilities of bureaucrats have a significant positive effect on the 
quality of financial reporting (Cheng, 1992). Bureaucratic experience enables 
improvements in the ability of internal stakeholders to understand and use 
performance measurement systems and improves the use of performance 
indicators (de Lancer & Holzer, 2001). Therefore, the accounting abilities of 
bureaucrats may influence the disclosure of PIs. As a proxy for normative 
isomorphism, the accounting ability of a bureaucrat is measured by years of 
experience. 
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Accountability in the Public Sector 
 
Accountability and the rendering of accounts in the public sector have received a 
considerable amount of attention in the public sector literature, where 
accountability is based on the presentation of accounts or performance in 
accounting terms (Tomkims, 1987). 
 
The International Federation of Accountants Public Sector Committee 
(2000) defines accountability in the public sector as: 
 
The process whereby public sector entities, and the individuals 
within them, are responsible for their decisions and actions, 
including their stewardship of public funds and all aspects of 
performance, and submit themselves to appropriate external 
scrutiny. It is achieved by all parties having a clear 
understanding of those responsibilities, and having clearly 
defined roles through a robust structure. In effect, accountability 
is the obligation to answer for a responsibility conferred (p. 137). 
 
Accordingly, within the Westminster system of government, public 
expenditures and revenue decisions are made by an executive and are 
implemented through the administrative arm, the public service. 
 
There are different definitions of accountability in the public sector 
accounting literature. Stewart (1984) defines accountability as a ladder that 
distinguishes between performance accountability and accountability for probity 
and legality. Stewart (1984) also discusses accountability information systems 
and notes that an accountability information system should report on all levels of 
accountability for which there is a need for a system that reports financial 
information, output and outcomes information. The information needs of user 
groups vary. For example, the citizenry may be interested in the results or 
effectiveness of a public sector entity whereas oversight and legislative bodies 
may be jointly focused on wider performance information, including efficiency 
and probity (Hyndman & Anderson, 1997). 
 
An important aspect of accountability is reporting. Accountability is 
exchanged for trust or empowerment. By definition, it involves an obligation to 
explain an employee's actions and to justify these actions to those who have 
responsibility over them. It is an obligation to report, which is different from 
responsibility, the obligation to act (Taylor & Pincus, 1999). In this study, we 
examine two types of accountability—internal accountability and external 
accountability. Internal accountability includes Chief Finance Officers (CFO), Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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Management and Employees of an organisation. External accountability includes 
Parliament, Ministers and the citizens of Malaysia. 
 
 
HYPOTHESES FORMULATION 
 
Issues identified in previous studies were used to formulate the theoretical 
framework and research questions for this analysis. Figure 1 depicts the empirical 
schema tested. The hypothesised relationships between all constructs are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Figure 1. Empirical schema 
 
Use of Performance Indicator Information 
 
A number of studies have focused on the use of performance measures in the 
public sector. Alijarde (1997) studied the perceived usefulness of information to 
users of local governmental financial reports, and Hyndman and Anderson (1995) 
examined the users of state and local government reports. To the best of our 
knowledge, the amount of research on performance measurement in Malaysia is 
limited. Nichol and Taylor (2001) examined changes in the extent of disclosures 
of various categories of accountability and performance information in the annual 
public accounts of the Malaysian government, its ministries and other public 
sector entities for the years from 1985 to 1995. The findings of the study indicate 
limited changes in the extent and quality of disclosures of accountability and 
performance information in these public sector reports. This finding suggests that 
the public's ability to assess the annual performance and discharge of 
accountability by federal government entities and the entire government remains 
limited in Malaysia. The aim of this research was to determine whether the 
accountability and performance reporting of Malaysian federal Ministries and 
Oversight 
Bodies 
 
Political 
Visibility 
 
Bureaucrats 
Accounting 
Ability 
 
Extent of Use of 
Performance 
Indicator 
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State government departments has improved since the introduction of MAMPU 
circular 2/2005 and whether public access to this information has improved. 
 
In this study, the disclosure of accountability information and the use of 
performance indicators were assessed by asking respondents to answer a series of 
questions related to the development and adoption of different types of 
performance measures used by the organisation. Accountability in Federal and 
State governments is measured by financial and non-financial performance 
indicators. Performance indicators also have a significant role in managerial or 
internal controls because they ensure that organisations are managed in the best 
interests of all the stakeholders (Bullen, 2003). Performance information is 
paramount in discharging accountability, and a concentration on the provision of 
traditional financial accounting information may reduce accountability by 
focusing on unimportant details (Hyndman & Anderson, 1998). 
 
Martinez-Gonzalez and Marti (2006) argue that accountability and the 
rendering of accounts are interrelated concepts. They claim that without the 
delegation of power or a certain capacity to do things, accountability cannot be 
required, and accountability is manifested, justified, and delivered though a 
suitable rendering of accounts. This rendering of accounts involves disclosing 
performance results and explaining achievements. 
 
Accountability and the rendering of accounts in the public sector have 
received a considerable amount of attention in the public sector literature, where 
accountability is based on the presentation of accounts or performance in 
accounting terms (Tomkims, 1987). However, following the adoption of public 
sector reforms in many developed countries, researchers have criticised this 
approach. For example, Humphrey, Miller and Scapens (1993) argue that "the 
scope of accountability should be expanded beyond the typical accounting 
justification" (p. 24). 
 
Martinez-Gonzalez and Marti (2006) argue that accountability and the 
rendering of accounts are difficult to achieve in the public sector because of the 
nature of public resources. In the public sector, resources cannot be measured, 
and indicators that can provide immediate and direct information on performance 
cannot be calculated because of the absence of profit. Thus, accountability is 
considered to be more important in the public sector than in the private sector. 
 
Questions in our survey (see Appendix) refer to both the disclosure of 
internal and external accountability information and the use of performance 
indicators. 
 
 Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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Oversight Bodies 
 
Institutional theory suggests that regulatory requirements or oversight bodies are 
relevant organisational factors of the success of reform implementation in 
government organisations (Brignall &  Modell, 2000). Furthermore, in 
institutional environments, such as Malaysian state governments, which depend 
primarily on external organisations and centralised government departments such 
as the Accountant-General Department for financial support and secondarily on 
actual performance, external bodies have the authority to impose organisational 
practices on subordinate units. Consequently, when subordinate organisations 
implement the required practices, the actual results tend to be superficial (Scott, 
1987). 
 
In 1990, three accounting standards specifically related to financial 
reporting by government organisations were introduced into public sector 
accounting practices in Malaysia  (Nichol  &  Taylor,  2001). The aim of 
introducing these practices was to increase the focus on managerial 
accountability. With this shift in emphasis, the Malaysian Government required 
public sector entities to capture efficiency and effectiveness reporting in their 
annual reports (Taylor & Pincus, 1999). 
 
In Malaysia, Nichol and Taylor (2001) studied the extent of disclosure of 
the various categories of performance information by groups of ministries and 
other public sector entities. They performed a content analysis on a selection of 
public sector accounts from 1985 to 1995. Their analysis found that performance 
indicators were seriously lacking in public accounts and that the disclosure of 
efficiency and effectiveness performance indicators had declined to only 6 
instances in 1995, of which only 2 were justified. The authors found no 
efficiency indicators in the 1995 reports. 
 
A possible explanation for the poor results above is provided by Nichol 
and Taylor (2001): 
 
There has been no proper and specified mechanism for 
measuring performance information. Furthermore, the deficiency 
in reporting of effectiveness indicators was possibly due to the 
non-mandatory status of effectiveness audits (p. 43).  
 
From this perspective, coercive mechanisms as suggested by di Maggio and 
Powell (1983) may take place in practice. 
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Based on the above discussion, hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
 
H1:  A positive relationship exists between the influence of oversight 
bodies and the use of performance indicators in the Annual Reports 
of Malaysian government departments. 
 
Political Visibility 
 
The implementation of public measurement systems (PMSs) in governments 
requires changes in the operation, personnel, structure and culture of government. 
Such changes are likely to create resistance within an organisation. Therefore, to 
ensure success in the development and use of performance indicators, internal 
support in the form of management commitments is important. de Lancer, Julnes 
and Holzer (2001) stated that changes can only occur if the top level of 
management has committed to adopting and implementing a PMS. 
 
Some research has been conducted in the private sector in Malaysia. 
Pham, Gray and Morris (2003) studied corporate financial reporting transparency 
in Malaysia before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. They 
measured transparency in terms of compliance with Malaysian Accounting 
Standards  (MASBs) and the voluntary adoption of International Accounting 
Standards (IASs) and the US GAAP program, which cover a range of financial 
reporting issues. The authors hypothesised that as the size of Malaysian firms 
increased, the transparency of their financial reports would also increase. The 
results of their study show that in both 1996 and 2001, all mandatory and 
voluntary transparency indexes were significantly positively associated with firm 
size. 
 
Lim and Mckinnon (1993) defined an entity as politically visible if it 
attracted a disproportionate share of scrutiny by politicians, the general public or 
other accountants, causing it to become a possible target for the imposition of 
political costs. Political costs are associated with the redistribution of a 
department's resources to other parts of the public sector, the absorption of its 
function by other agencies, and the replacement of key senior management. Thus, 
these authors argued that government departments may attempt to manage their 
political visibility by making disclosures in their annual reports to minimise 
political costs. Lim and  Mckinnon (1993) used three proxies for political 
visibility: firm size, number of employees and level of coverage in the official 
records of NSW parliamentary debates. They found a positive correlation 
between the political visibility of the statutory authorities and the level of 
voluntary disclosure of financial and nonfinancial information. They confirmed 
the political cost hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), which states that 
entities subjected to a greater amount of scrutiny are more likely to disclose Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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information than those subjected to less scrutiny. In this study, political visibility 
was measured by the size of a governmental department and proxied for coercive 
isomorphism by the number of employees and the total revenue. 
 
Based on the above discussion, hypothesis 2 is as follows: 
 
H2:  A positive relationship exists between the political visibility of 
Malaysian government departments and the use of performance 
indicators in the Annual Reports of these departments. 
 
Bureaucratic Accounting Ability 
 
An organisational factor that is expected to influence the development and use of 
performance indicators is the extent to which a bureaucrat's knowledge and 
experience supports program implementation (Shields 1995; Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 
2004). Shields (1995) argued that training in the design, implementation and use 
of management accounting programs allows organisations to articulate the links 
between organisational objectives. This ability, in turn, provides a mechanism for 
employees to understand, accept and feel comfortable with new programs. 
According to the implementation of PMSs in Malaysia, a lack of understanding 
of the system affected the practices (Nichol &  Taylor, 2001). Technical 
knowledge allows improvements in the ability of internal stakeholders to 
understand and use PMSs and positively improves the development and use of 
performance indicators (de Lancer & Holzer, 2001). In Malaysia, several efforts, 
such as technical training and formal post-graduate degree programs, have 
attempted to increase the knowledge of government employees and officers 
(Prime  Minister  Office  of Malaysia, 2010). From this perspective, normative 
mechanisms, as suggested by di Maggio and Powell (1983), may have a 
considerable influence on reporting programs. 
 
Malloy (2003, p. 10) noted that normative isomorphism is best illustrated 
in professional organisations. As personnel from different organisations band 
together and standardise their credentials and practices, their autonomous 
organisations, such as hospitals, universities and fire departments, inevitably 
come to resemble one  another. Malloy (2003) observed that normative 
isomorphism for government agencies can signify (a) conforming to the 
behavioural standards, such as neutrality, hierarchy and professional demeanour, 
of a professional public service or (b) following the norms and values of a social 
movement, such as extensive consulting activities. Bureaucratic accounting 
abilities are proxied for normative isomorphism, including bureaucrat experience. 
 
Therefore, on the basis of the above discussion, hypothesis 3  is as 
follows: Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
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H3:  A relationship exists between a bureaucrat's accounting ability and 
the use of performance indicators in the Annual Reports of 
Malaysian government departments. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the proposed model, the variables and the number 
of items used to measure each variable. The structural model, also known as the 
inner model, focuses on the hypothesised relationships or paths between the 
latent variables (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2005). All measurable 
items used in this research were classified as reflective indicators. Internal 
accountability and external accountability are additional variables that will be 
examined to determine the extent of the use of performance indicators. 
 
Table 1 
Research model variables 
 
Latent Variables  Short Code  Manifest Variables  # of items 
Use of Performance Indicator  PI use  PIuse  to PIuse7  7 items 
Oversight Bodies  OAG  OAG1 to OAG5  5 items 
Political Visibility  POL  POL1 to POL1  1 item 
Bureaucrats Accounting Ability  ACC  ACC1 toACC2  2 items 
Internal Accountability  I ACC  IACC to IACC1  1 item 
External Accountability  EACC  EACC1 to EACC3  3 items 
 
Legend:  Extent of use of performance indicators includes; efficiency, effectiveness, quality, quantity, 
timeliness and cost performance indicators  Oversight bodies include; The Accountant General, and 
Treasury Department  Political Visibility includes; Size (number of employees and total revenue) 
Bureaucrats accounting ability include; years of experience, qualification and membership of a professional 
accounting body. 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
This research was based on a pilot study of semi-structured interviews with a 
sample of Malaysian SFOs and a questionnaire. The pilot study was conducted 
because of the lack of empirical research on the use of performance indicators in 
Malaysian government departments. Data from the interviews were used to 
design the questions for the questionnaire survey. 
 
Several senior finance officers (SFOs) from Malaysian Federal and State 
government departments were interviewed. The subjects were selected from 
government departments, and based on their size and importance, they were 
deemed to be more politically visible in the public domain. Because of time Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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constraints, only 12 interviews were conducted. The interviews were conducted 
in English because Malaysian SFOs must be fluent in English. The Malaysian 
departments are classified as M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M7, M8, M9, M10, 
M11 and M12. The purpose of this phase of research was to gather information 
on the type and number of performance indicators to aid in the formation of 
questions for the questionnaire. Table 2 lists the interviewees. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and based on a questionnaire with 
three sections. Section One contained 20 questions on accountability. Of these 
questions,  17  were open-ended and asked respondents to express an opinion 
related to their department. Section Two contained sixteen questions on 
performance indicators, six of which were open ended. The questions allowed 
respondents to include additional information on performance measures. Section 
Three allowed respondents to add additional information pertinent to the issues 
raised in the interview. 
 
Table 2 
List of interviewees 
 
Interviewee  Department 
M1  State 
M2  State 
M3  State 
M4  State 
M5  State 
M6  State 
M7  Federal 
M8  Federal 
M9  Federal 
M10  Federal 
M11  Federal 
M12  Federal 
 
The field survey included a questionnaire with instructions for 
completion, a cover letter and a self-addressed reply envelope, which was sent to 
the SFOs of 170 Malaysian government departments. The questions were written 
in  Bahasa Malaysia. Although it was known from interviews that Malaysian 
SFOs speak and write English, the cover letters and questionnaires were written 
in  Bahasa Malaysia  to prompt a higher response rate. The cover letter and 
questionnaire were translated into Bahasa Malaysia by a professional interpreter Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
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and then sent to an independent translator for back translation to ensure that both 
the English version and the Bahasa Malaysia version were compatible. Responses 
in Bahasa Malaysia were translated into English by a qualified interpreter. Of the 
170 questionnaires, 25 were returned (14.7%). A follow-up questionnaire added 
12 usable responses for a total of 37 usable responses, representing an overall 
response rate of 21.76%. The details are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 3 
Distribution of responses 
 
  Sent (170)  Received (37)   
  Frequency  %  Frequency  %  Response Rate (21.76%) 
Federal  70  41.1  25  67.6  35.7% 
State  100  58.8  12  32.4  12.0% 
 
A total of 25 responses were received from Malaysian Federal 
Government Ministries, and 12 were received from Malaysian State Government 
departments. Table 2 shows that most respondents were from Federal 
government ministries (67.6%). Table 2 also shows that the smallest number of 
respondents was from State government departments (32.4%). The relatively low 
response rate can be explained by two factors. First, State government 
departments may lack performance-reporting experience, and many departments 
still do not have their own websites. Those that do not publish their financial 
reports in English. Furthermore, many State government departments were 
formed from departments that existed long before the reform agenda of the 
current government was instituted. Second, in the Malaysian government context, 
low responses are expected. 
 
Non-response Bias 
 
All respondents in this study were from Federal and State government 
departments in Malaysia, including the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, 
Labuan and Putrajaya and  13  States (Negeri) with a total population of 
28,377,090 million (Malaysian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). The survey was 
distributed in August 2007. Mail surveys are assumed to be an appropriate 
method for collecting data in community-based studies. This method is 
particularly useful for research on large or geographically dispersed populations, 
such as that of Malaysia. This method of data collection increases the coverage 
area of a study and can be conducted in less time and in a cost-effective manner. 
Therefore, this method was considered to be suitable for this study (Macdonald, 
Neuburn-Cook, Schopflocher, & Richter, 2009). Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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Researchers must exercise care in appropriately addressing the issue of 
nonresponse bias. Otherwise, the results of a study cannot be generalised. 
Nonresponse bias can be addressed by using the extrapolation method, which is 
based on the assumption that that subjects who respond less rapidly are more 
similar to non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Armstrong and 
Overton (1977, p. 397) stated that: 
 
The most common type of extrapolation is carried over 
successive waves of implementing a questionnaire. Wave refers 
to the response generated by a stimulus (i.e., a follow up 
questionnaire). Participants who respond in later waves are 
assumed to have responded because of the increased stimulus 
and are expected to be similar to non-respondents. 
 
Of the 14 late responses, 8 were from Federal departments, and 6 were 
from State Government departments. Because of the large number of Malaysian 
States (13), the cost and time involved in analysing data and the low response 
rate, the individual Malaysian State responses were not analysed. A further 
analysis of responses in the second wave of requests revealed no significant 
differences from the earlier wave of responses. Consequently, response bias was 
not considered to be an issue, and the results can be generalised. 
 
Table 4 
Validity and reliability tests for variables from the questionnaire data 
 
Attributes  Mean  t-test  Total  p-value 
AG  3.027  12.277  36  .000 
Minister  2.676  12.196  36  .000 
Treas  2.730  11.637  36  .000 
Lobby  2.703  11.188  36  .000 
Political Visibility  3.650  22.693  36  .000 
Accounting Ability  2.027  10.794  36  .000 
 
A validity test was performed using a one sample t-test for the attributes 
that influence the Malaysian government department's use of performance 
indicators (PIs). The attributes tested for validity and reliability for Malaysia 
include Oversight Bodies (Accountant-General Office, Minister, Treasury, Lobby 
Groups), Political Visibility (Size) and Bureaucratic Accounting Ability 
(Experience, Qualification and Membership of a professional accounting body). 
The results are presented in Table 4. 
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Reliability Tests 
 
Reliability is related to estimates of the degree to which a measurement is free of 
random or unstable errors. Reliability refers to the consistency, stability, and 
repeatability of a data collection instrument. A reliable instrument does not 
respond to chance factors or environmental conditions; it will show consistent 
results if repeated or if used by different investigators. The reliability of an 
instrument says nothing about its validity; the wrong concept can be measured in 
a consistent, stable fashion (Hair et al., 2005). 
 
The Cronbach alpha value is a widely used reliability coefficient based 
on an internal consistency test. It is based on the average correlations of variable 
items with one another if the items are standardised or the average covariance 
among items if the items are not standardised. If the items in a variable are, to a 
certain extent, measuring a common entity, then they will be positively correlated 
with one another (Hair et al., 2005). A variable is considered reliable if the 
Cronbach alpha value is both positive and greater than 0.6. 
 
Table 5 shows the reliability test results for the following variables: 
performance indicator disclosure, disclosure of accountability information, 
oversight bodies, and experience. The results in Table 4 show that only one 
variable—the disclosure of accountability information—failed the reliability test 
because the Cronbach alpha (α) value was less than 0.6 and all 5 variable items 
were not correlated. The other dependent and independent variables were reliable 
because the Cronbach alpha (α) value for each variable was positive and greater 
than 0.6. 
 
Table 5 
Reliability  tests 
 
Dependent Variables  No. of 
items 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
Frequency of Performance Indicators disclosed (Meandiscl).  6  0.940 
Discharge of Accountability Information  5  0.506 
Independent Variables     
Oversight Bodies  7  0.802 
Experience  2  0.832 
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DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The first subsection of this section discusses aspects of the disclosure of 
accountability information by government departments, as obtained from the 
main questionnaire. Then, the hypothesis testing is presented; a multiple 
regression analysis was used to evaluate the impacts of oversight bodies, political 
visibility and bureaucratic accounting ability on the use of performance 
indicators. 
 
Disclosure of Accountability Information 
 
A series of questions related to the disclosure of accountability information by 
Malaysian government departments was included in the questionnaire (see 
Appendix). The first question asked respondents to indicate, on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (no importance) to 5 (highest importance), their perceptions 
of the aspects that influence accountability disclosures in Annual Reports. The 
results are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Discharge of accountability by government departments 
 
Accountability disclosure  Means  Sig (2 – tailed) (p-value)* 
Objectives  4.16  0.374 
Efficiency  3.97  0.025 
Effectiveness  4.16  0.927 
Compliance  4.03  0.388 
Trends  4.05  0.000 
 
Legend: Table 5 is an independent sample t-test. This table is based on a 5 point likert scale 
(range from 1 = no importance to 5 = highest importance).* highly significant at p < 0.1. 
The table is based on a sample size of 37 cases. 
 
The result for the effectiveness of indicators is interesting based on 
interviews with the SFOs of Malaysian departments who believed that the 
achievement of outcomes was the most important factor in the discharge of 
accountability. Furthermore, Nichol and Taylor (2001) studied the importance of 
accountability information in Malaysian federal public accounts and found a 
decline in the disclosure of effectiveness performance information, with 9 
effectiveness indicators being disclosed in the 1985 Malaysian public accounts 
compared with only 6 indicators in 1995. The results from the current study 
indicate that since 1995, the importance of disclosing effectiveness performance 
information has increased among the SFOs of Malaysian government 
departments. A possible explanation for this increase could be the adoption of 
public sector reforms by the Malaysian Government. Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
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Table 6 shows that efficiency performance information is highly 
significant (p  = 0.025; mean = 3.97). This result indicates that government 
departments consider efficiency information to be important in the discharge of 
accountability information. This result is interesting because interviewees 
commented that their Ministers are not concerned with how the department 
achieves their goals, so long as the goals are achieved. A similar situation has 
been observed in Malaysian government departments. The SFO of State 
department M3 commented that: 
 
In Malaysia, we do not have a specified mechanism for 
measuring performance information. Further, the government 
has instructed us to focus on outcomes only. 
 
Thus, as shown in Table 7, the high results for effectiveness indicators, 
trends and compliance and the relatively high result for efficiency indicators 
indicate that since the introduction of the PMS, the use of performance 
information has increased. 
 
The extent of disclosure for the various categories of performance 
indicator information by Malaysian government departments is shown in Table 7, 
which includes categories for efficiency, effectiveness, quality, timeliness and 
cost. This table shows the responses to the question on performance indicators for 
each department in their Annual Report. The results indicate that 2 of the 12 
departments did not disclose any performance measures in their Annual Report. 
Table 7 shows that Quantity Indicators were mostly disclosed by Malaysia 
departments in their annual reports and that quantity indicators represent the 
number/amount of goods/services being administered. 
 
One possible explanation for the limited disclosure of efficiency and 
effectiveness indicators may be that government departments are still relatively 
inexperienced at disclosing these indicators. This assertion is supported by 
comments from the representative of State Department M1: 
 
There has been no proper and specified mechanism for 
measuring performance information; the deficiency in reporting 
effectiveness indicators is possibly perpetuated by the non-
mandatory status of effectiveness audits. 
 
Only six of the Malaysian departments interviewed claimed disclosure of 
all eight types of performance indicators. 
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Table 7 
Disclosure of performance information by Malaysian Government Departments 
 
Department  Effic  Effect  Output  Outcome  Time  Quality  Quantity  Cost  Total PIs 
M1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  6 
M2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
M3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
M4  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
M5  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
M6  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
M7  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
M8  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  3 
M9  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  5 
M10  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
M11  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
M12  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total PIs  7  6  9  6  9  8  10  8  63 
 
Notes: Effic = Efficiency, Effect = Effectiveness, Time = Timeliness 
 
The SFO of Malaysian Federal government department M11 stated that: 
 
We only report efficiency indicators internally, as the Minister 
and CEO want to ensure that our department is operating 
efficiently. For our annual reports, which are distributed 
externally, it is only necessary to report what we achieve. 
 
Two questions related to the form and content of an organisation's 
Annual Report assessed the importance of the disclosure of accountability 
information. The first question probed perceptions of the level of influence that 
specific groups of taxpayers, including the Auditor-General, Treasury, lobby 
groups, the Minister, and the CEO, have on the form of information included in 
the Annual Report (Table 7). The data reveal that the Accountant–General had a 
mean score of 3.35, indicating influence on the form of performance information 
in the Annual Report. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
To test the hypotheses, the construct equations were interpreted with standard 
errors and test statistics. The construct equations measure the extent to which one 
factor relates to another, that is, the extent to which the structural path coefficient 
and  t-values between hypothesised constructs reflected direct relationships Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
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(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The t-values (robust scores) must be significant to 
support the hypothesised paths and should be greater than 1.96 or 2.56 for alpha 
protection levels of 0.05 and 0.01, respectively (Gefen, Straub,  &  Boudreau, 
2000). The structural relationship results are reported in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Summary of hypothesis testing results 
 
Dependent variable  Independent variable  Malaysia 
    Beta  p-value 
MEANUSEP  CONSTANT    0.000 
  ACCOUNTANT–
GENERAL 
–0.337  0.051** 
  Minister Experience  n/a 
0.112 
n/a 
0.229 
Membership    0.108               0.244 
 
Legend: Table 8 is a linear regression model with backward regression (model six). The above table is based on 
a sample size of 37 Malaysia). 
** indicates significance at p < 0.05. 
Model fit Adj r squared 0.086, F value = 4.096 and Sig F = 0.051 
 
Table 8 shows the multiple regression analysis results for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 8 shows that only the oversight body influenced the ACCOUNTANT– 
GENERAL  (beta of –0.337 and significance of 0.051). All other oversight 
bodies, including the Minister, Treasury, and Lobby, had SIG T > 0.05 and were 
therefore not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
 
The strong significant result for the Accountant–General in Malaysia can 
be explained by increases in the quality of accountability-related disclosures 
required by Malaysian government departments. In  studying the Malaysian 
departments, Nichol and Taylor (2001) found a major shift in the disclosure 
categories of performance indicators between 1985 and 1995. Of the six 
categories of compliance, three categories, compliance reporting, Auditor–
General certificates, and the number and type of abridged, consolidated financial 
statements, showed important changes. 
 
Another issue is whether public accounts should contain the summarised 
audit report on the government entity's major programmes. All 12 Malaysian 
Federal department SFOs disagreed with this Statement, with the respondent 
from M12 arguing that: 
 
The Auditor–General's opinion is sufficient for the discharge of 
accountability in relation to a government entity's major Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
59 
programmes because the public accounts are audited by the 
Auditor–General. The Auditor–General's role is to check the 
public accounts of the Public Sector and to form an independent 
opinion of whether Malaysian Federal departments or other 
Public Sector entities conform to their audit requirements. 
Unless a fundamental error is discovered by the auditor, changes 
are not made to the drafting of the Annual Report. 
 
The Malaysian SFOs were also asked if they believed that the reporting 
of internal controls should be mandatory. All 12 respondents agreed that such 
reporting should not be made mandatory. The SFO of Federal department M9 
stated that: 
 
Internal controls are not governed by any external factors. We do 
monthly account checks. This is referred to as Accountability of 
control. The internal control report is transferred to the Central 
administration system in Malaysia. 
 
Furthermore, the SFO of Malaysian State department M6 commented that: 
 
In Malaysia, we follow an outcome-based approach to reporting 
performance. Therefore, we report outcomes on a monthly basis 
but not performance indicators. Performance indicators are 
reported internally to senior management and are thus only 
reported on an annual basis. 
 
Table 8 presents the regression results for SIZE. Here, size is a surrogate 
for political visibility and serves as the independent variable. The results in this 
table illustrate that the SIZE of a government department is excluded from 
backward regression model six and therefore is not significant. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 is rejected, indicating no relationship between the political visibility 
of Malaysian government departments and the extent of use of performance 
indicators in the annual reports of those departments. Table 8 further illustrates 
that the variable EXPERIENCE, which is related to an SFO's accounting ability, 
is not significant with a p-value of 0.202. Therefore, hypothesis 3, which is 
related to accounting ability, is rejected. 
 
The absence of political visibility and bureaucrat experience effects on PI 
disclosure can be explained by the following comments. 
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The SFO of Federal Department M2 stated the following: 
 
I am accountable to my CEO and the Secretary-General. I am 
given direction by these people as to what performance measures 
need to be reported and what budget I have to account for. In the 
Malaysian public sector, we now have a modified budget system 
in which managers have more power to manage their resources; 
that is, the managers are able to manage. 
 
The SFO of Malaysian State department M5 commented that: 
 
Now, we are busy with the demands set by our Minister. We put 
all our information on the web to enable people to access the 
information they need about us. In the past, before technology 
and the use of the internet, we received many demands from 
citizens for information. Now, they can go to our website and 
download whatever information they need. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
From our results, in Malaysian Federal and State governments, oversight bodies, 
political visibility and the accounting abilities of bureaucrats do not appear to 
influence the use of performance indicators. The only oversight body that 
influenced the use of performance indicators was the Accountant–General 
department, implying that the main reason for developing indicators is simply to 
comply with central government regulations and that compliance rather than 
performance is the main motivation. 
 
This result is not surprising, and the SFO of State department M2 stated 
that  there is no formal mechanism in place for measuring performance 
information, particularly the efficiency and effectiveness of government 
programs. 
 
Similar results were obtained by analysing the use of performance 
indicators. For the disclosure of accountability information, trends and efficiency 
information were disclosed most often. The Malaysian SFO stated that trends and 
efficiency information are essential in the discharge of accountability 
information. This result is a gradual improvement for SFOs who measure their 
departments' performance. 
 
The SFO from Malaysian Federal Department M4 commented that in 
Malaysia, Public Servants are not as computer literate as those in Australia. In Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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Malaysia, most Federal departments have their own websites with information 
about the department in both English and Bahasa Malaysia. However, financial 
information on the websites is limited and only available in Bahasa Malaysia. 
Malaysian State Government departments also have their own websites with 
information about their services, staff, finances and operations. However, the 
information is only in Bahasa Malaysia. 
 
The SFO of Malaysian Federal Department M1 commented that: 
 
In Malaysia, we want to do like Australia and have all our 
financial and operating information on our website and in 
English, but we do not have the people who can help us to do 
this. Computer technology is not considered very important in 
Malaysia. Also, only officers at a senior level in Malaysian 
Public Service need to have a good knowledge of English, so we 
lack the staff expertise to have a system like you have in 
Australia, which is very good. 
 
The overall results of this study indicate that Malaysian Federal and State 
SFOs still have some work to do in improving the use of performance indicators 
in their government departments. This research provides an understanding of 
factors that influence the use of performance indicators, which could be used to 
formulate future government policy. This paper also provided some evidence of 
the existence of institutional isomorphism. This study investigated three attributes 
that could possibly influence the extent of the use of performance indicators. 
Future studies could examine other factors, such as culture, management 
commitment and salary, to determine their influence on the extent of the use of 
performance indicators. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Performance Measurement in the Public Sector 
 
This questionnaire seeks information on the accountability and types of 
performance indicators disclosed by government agencies. 
 
The majority of the questions require your view or opinion. There is no right or 
wrong answer. However your careful consideration of each response, based on 
your own experiences and beliefs is requested. 
 
Your responses will be anonymous and only statistical aggregations will be 
reported. Please complete the following sections of the questionnaire: 
 
Section One  Accountability 
Section Two  External Influences 
Section Three  Performance Indicators 
Section Four  Demographic Data 
Section Five  General 
 
This questionnaire will take approximately 15–20 minutes to complete. 
Unless otherwise requested, please circle your response to each question. 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the self addressed envelope by no 
later than 7 July 2007. 
Your kind participation in this study is greatly appreciated. 
 
SECTION ONE: ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
1.  In discharging the accountability of government departments, how important, 
in your opinion, is disclosure of the following information in annual reports? 
 
  No 
importance 
Little  
importance 
Quite 
important 
Very 
important 
Highest 
importance 
(a) Information relating 
to a department's 
objectives 
1  2  3  4  5 
(b) Information relating 
to efficiency e.g. 
ratios of outputs to 
inputs 
1  2  3  4  5 Performance Reporting in Malaysia 
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2.  To whom do you consider you are accountable? Please rank each of the 
following responses from 1 to 5 (with 1 being the most important). 
 
(a)  Chief Executive Officer    ————————— 
(b) Parliament    —————————           
(c)  Public at large    ————————— 
(d) Treasury    —————————       
(e)  Minister    —————————       
 
3.   In your opinion, when preparing the annual report of your government 
department how much influence do the following parties have on the FORM 
of information that will be included in the annual report? 
 
  No 
influence 
Little 
influence 
Reasonable 
influence 
High 
Influence 
Highest 
influence 
(a)  Taxpayers  1  2  3  4  5 
(b)  User's of the 
department's goods or 
services 
1  2  3  4  5 
(c)  Treasury  1  2  3  4  5 
(d)  Lobby Groups  1  2  3  4  5 
(e)  Minister  1  2  3  4  5 
(f)  Chief Executive 
Officer  1  2  3  4  5 
(c) Information relating 
to effectiveness e.g. 
achievement of stated 
objectives 
1  2  3  4  5 
(d)  Information 
confirming a 
department has 
complied with 
relevant legislation 
1  2  3  4  5 
(e) Trends in financial 
statement figures e.g. 
annual performance 
for the past 3 years 
1  2  3  4  5 
(f)   Other items of 
information which 
you believe are 
important to disclose 
in annual reports. 
Please specify: 
1  2  3  4  5 Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
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4.   In your opinion, when preparing the  annual report of your government 
agency, how much influence do the following have on the CONTENT of 
information included in the annual report. 
 
  No 
influence 
Some 
influence 
Reasonable 
influence 
High 
Influence 
Highest 
influence 
(a)  Taxpayers  1  2  3  4  5 
(b)  User's of the department's 
goods or services 
1  2  3  4  5 
(c)  Treasury  1  2  3  4  5 
(d)  Lobby Groups  1  2  3  4  5 
(e)  Minister  1  2  3  4  5 
(f)  Chief Executive Officer  1  2  3  4  5 
 
5.  Our organization's performance measures are made available to the public. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
If not, why not: 
———————————————————————————————— 
———————————————————————————————— 
———————————————————————————————— 
 
6.  Performance Indicators are: 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
                
(a) Available on request  1  2  3  4  5 
(b) Mailed to citizen groups  1  2  3  4  5 
(c) On our organisation's website  1  2  3  4  5 
(d) On display in the public libraries  1  2  3  4  5 
(e) On display in our organisation's library  1  2  3  4  5 
(f) Released to news media  1  2  3  4  5 
(g) Discussed at public meetings  1  2  3  4  5 
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SECTION TWO: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
 
With questions 7 to 37, the following scales apply: 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never  Seldom  Sometimes  Often  Very Often 
 
7.   There is consultation with the Accountant-General Office during the course 
of preparing the annual report. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
8.  Changes are made to the drafting of the annual report on the suggestions of 
the appointed minister. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
9.  Changes are made to the drafting of the annual report on the suggestions of 
the Auditor-General office during the audit review process. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
10. There is consultation with the Treasury Department during the course of 
preparing the annual report. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
11. Changes are made to the drafting of the annual report on the suggestions of 
Treasury officers. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
12. The views of major lobby/interest groups are taken into consideration when 
preparing the annual report. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
13. Specific needs of lobby/interest groups are satisfied by certain information 
included in the annual report. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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14. There is consultation with the board of management or similar before 
preparing the annual report. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
15. A working group is established consisting of individuals both within and 
outside our organisation to develop our performance measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
16. The managers (senior, middle and/or line) are involved in the development of 
all performance measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
17. Experts are employed to assist with the development of our organisations 
performance measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
18. Lower level employees are involved in the development of our performance 
measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
19. Citizens and/or citizen's groups are involved in the development of our 
performance measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
20. We have difficulty getting managers (senior, middle and/or line) to accept 
our performance measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
21. We have difficulty in getting lower level employees to accept our 
performance measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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22. We have difficulty in getting citizens and /or citizen groups to accept our 
performance measures. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
23. We have little or no control over the choice of the performance measures 
reported on our organisation's performance. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
24. We undertake performance audits in our organisation 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
25. Performance audits take place: 
 
Less than once a year  More than once a year 
Once a year   
   
Other: Please write the information in the box below. 
 
 
 
 
 
26. Performance audits are undertaken by, 
 
External Auditor  Auditor – General 
CEO   
 
Other: Please write the information in the box below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
72 
27. What does the performance audits include? Please answer both the statements 
below: 
 
(a)  Performance data verification 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
(b) Financial data verification 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
SECTION THREE: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
28. How often did you compute the following types of departmental performance 
measures during the last financial year? (Please circle the appropriate box.) 
 
  Weekly  Monthly  Quarterly  Half Yearly  Yearly 
(a) Efficiency  1  2  3  4  5 
(b) Effectiveness  1  2  3  4  5 
(c) Quality  1  2  3  4  5 
(d) Quantity  1  2  3  4  5 
(e) Timeliness  1  2  3  4  5 
(f) Cost  1  2  3  4  5 
(g) Other (please specify)           
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With the following questions (29–39) please tick the appropriate box. 
 
29. How is the information on performance measures disseminated? 
 
  Efficiency  Effectiveness  Quality  Quantity  Timeliness  Cost  Others 
(a)  Annual 
report 
             
(b)  Internally to 
Senior 
Management 
             
(c)  Internally to 
all staff 
             
(d)  Externally to 
Auditor – 
General  or 
Treasury 
Department 
             
(e)  Tabled in 
document to 
Parliament 
             
(f)  Externally 
through 
pamphlets 
             
(g)  Externally 
through news 
sheets 
             
(h)  Externally 
through web 
sites 
             
(i)  Not 
applicable 
             
 
30. Our performance measures are derived from the missions, goals, objectives, 
and service standards established for our programs and/or organisation. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
         
 
31. When developing performance measures, we focus on what is important to 
measure rather than the availability of data. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
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32. We use our performance measures to track performance over time. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
         
 
33. We have difficulty compiling and distributing the data from our performance 
measurement system in a timely manner. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
         
 
34. We have difficulty measuring the quality of our programs and services 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
   
   
 
 
35. We have difficulty keeping our performance measures current and up to date. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
   
   
 
 
36. Our staff lack the analytical skills needed to effectively analyse the 
performance measurement data we collect. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
   
   
 
 
37. We establish standards and targets for most of our performance measures. 
 
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Most of the time  Always 
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SECTION FOUR: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
 
Tick (√) the appropriate box: 
 
38. Male  Female 
 
39.  Age Range   
Under 30  50 to 59 
30 to 39  60 and over 
40 to 49   
   
40. What is your current annual remuneration package (Gross)? 
       
Less than $80,000   
$80,000 to $100,000   
$100,000 to $130,000   
$130,000 and above   
 
41. Approximate size of your organisation (head count, including part – time and 
casual employees) 
 
More than 10,000 employees   
Between 5,001 – 10,000 employees   
Between 1,001 – 5,000 employees   
Between 100–1,000 employees   
Less than 100 employees   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maria Anna Mucciarone and John Neilson 
76 
42. Are you a member of a professional accounting body? 
 
Yes  No 
   
If yes, please tick all applicable boxes: 
 
CPA Australia   
ICAA   
ACCA   
 
Other (please specify below) 
 
 
 
 
43. Please indicate your length of service 
 
(a) In your current organisation 
 
Less than 1 year  More than 5 years 
1 to less than 3 years   
3 to less than 5 years   
 
(b) In your current position 
 
Less than 1 year  More than 5 years 
1 to less than 3 years   
3 to less than 5 years   
 
44. Which category is most appropriate to your organisation? 
 
Federal Government Agency 
State Government Department   
In which state are you located? 
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SECTION FIVE: GENERAL 
 
45. Please make any further comments in regards to your organisation's 
performance measurement system below. 
                     
                     
                     
                     
 
Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire. 
 
Would you like an analysis of the results of this study? 
 
Yes  No 
 
 
Name                 
Organisation                   
Address                   
 
 